We consider n risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren-Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear-quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state constraints enter the problem as terminal boundary conditions for finite and infinite time horizons. We prove existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and give closed-form solutions in some special cases. We also analyze qualitative properties of the equilibrium strategies and provide corresponding financial interpretations.
Introduction
In this paper we analyze a state-constrained differential game that arises for risk-averse economic agents aiming to liquidate a given asset position by a given time T > 0. Agents face both price impact and volatility risk. For a single agent there is hence a tradeoff between slow trading so as to reduce transaction costs from price impact and fast liquidation in view of volatility risk. Beginning with Bertsimas & Lo (1998) and Almgren & Chriss (2000) , a large numbers of papers has recently been studying the corresponding single-agent optimization problems in various settings; we refer to Lehalle (2013) and Gatheral & Schied (2013) for recent overviews and more complete lists of references. The problem becomes even more interesting when considering not just one but n agents who are aware of each others initial positions, a situation that is not unlikely to occur in reality; see Carlin et al. (2007) and . Together with Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2005) , these two papers were among the first to consider a corresponding game theoretic approach, but only consider openloop Nash equilibria for risk-neutral agents applying deterministic strategies. Moallemi et al. (2012) give an extension to a model with asymmetric information. Carmona & Yang (2011) use numerical simulations to study a system of coupled HJB equations arising from a closed-loop Nash equilibrium for two utility-maximizing agents. Lachapelle et al. (2013) apply mean-field games to modeling the price formation process in the presence of high-frequency traders. A two-player Nash equilibrium in a market impact model with exponentially decaying transient price impact is analyzed in Schied & Zhang (2013) .
Here we consider agents maximizing a mean-variance functional in a continuous-time Almgren & Chriss (2000) framework, which is a very common setup for portfolio liquidation in practice. It leads to a linear-quadratic differential game, which has the interesting additional feature of a terminal state constraint arising from the liquidation constraint imposed in portfolio liquidation. This state constraint leads to two-point boundary problems in place of the usual initial value problems connected with unconstrained differential games. Aside from the financial interpretation of our results, this paper thus also contributes a natural case study for a class state-constrained differential games.
Our main results provide existence and uniqueness statements for the corresponding Nash equilibria with both finite and infinite time horizon. In several cases we can also give closed-form solutions of the equilibrium strategies. These formulas allow us to discuss some qualitative properties of the Nash equilibrium. Some of these properties are surprising as they show that certain monotonicity properties that are discussed in the finance literature may break down under certain market conditions. See Lebedeva et al. (2012) for discussions and for an empirical analysis of a large data set of portfolio liquidations of large investors.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 we recall some background material on portfolio liquidation in the Almgren-Chriss framework. Existence, uniqueness, and representation results for Nash equilibria with finite time horizon are stated in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 contains a discussion of the qualitative properties of the corresponding two-player Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibria with infinite time horizon are discussed in Section 3. All proofs can be found in Section 4.
2 Nash equilibrium with finite time horizon
Background
We consider a standard continuous-time Almgren & Chriss (2000) framework for investors who are active over a fixed time period [0, T ] . An investor may hold an initial position of x shares and is required to close this position by time T . The information flow available to an investor is modeled by a filtration (F t ) t≥0 on a given probability space (Ω, F , P). The trading strategy employed by the investor is denoted by X = (X(t)) t∈ [0,T ] . It needs to satisfy the following conditions of admissibility:
• X satisfies the liquidation constraint X(T ) = 0; • X is adapted to the filtration (F t ) t≥0 ; • X is absolutely continuous in the sense that there exists a progressively measurable process (Ẋ(t)) t∈ [0,T ] such that for all ω ∈ Ω, T 0 (Ẋ(t, ω)) 2 dt < ∞ and
• there exists a constant c ≥ 0 such that |X(t, ω)| ≤ c for all t and ω. The class of all strategies that are admissible in this sense and satisfy X(0) = x for given x ∈ R will be denoted by X (x, T ). Let us also introduce the subclass X det (x, T ) of all strategies in X (x, T ) that are deterministic in the sense that they do not depend on ω. The 'unaffected price process' S 0 will describe the fluctuations of asset prices perceived by an investor who has no inside information on large trades carried out by other market participants during the time interval [0, T ]. In the Almgren-Chriss model it is usually assumed that S 0 follows a Bachelier model. Here we are sometimes also going to allow for an extra drift to describe current price trends. Thus,
where S 0 is a constant, W is a standard Brownian motion, σ ≥ 0, and b is deterministic and continuous. When an investor is using a strategy X ∈ X (x, T ), the strategy X will influence the prices at which assets are traded. In the linear Almgren-Chriss framework, one assumes that the resulting price is given by
where the constants γ ≥ 0 and λ > 0 describe the respective permanent and temporary price impact components. At each time t ∈ [0, T ], the infinitesimal amount of −Ẋ(t) dt shares are sold at price S X (t). The total revenues generated by the strategy X ∈ X (x, T ) are therefore given by
The optimal trade execution problem consists in maximizing a cost-risk functional of the revenues over all admissible strategies in X (x, T ). One possibility is the maximization of expected revenues,
as considered in many paper on optimal execution and, with the notable exception of Carmona & Yang (2011) , all other papers dealing with corresponding Nash equilibria. Bertsimas & Lo (1998) were among the first to propose this problem. In practice, it is common to take into account the volatility risk arising from late execution by maximizing a mean-variance criterion:
here α is a nonnegative risk-aversion parameter. When dealing with the problem (3), admissible strategies are usually restricted to the class X det (x, T ) of deterministic strategies. Except for the results in Lorenz & Almgren (2011) , little is known when general adapted strategies are used in (3); to the knowledge of the authors, not even the existence of maximizers has been established to date. The main reason for this is the lack of time consistency of the variance functional, which does not fit well into a context of dynamic optimization. On the other hand, Schied et al. (2010) show that the maximization of (3) over deterministic strategies X ∈ X det (x, T ) is equivalent to the maximization of the expected utility of revenues,
over all strategies in X (x, T ) when
is a CARA utility function with absolute risk aversion α ≥ 0. We refer to Lehalle (2013) and Gatheral & Schied (2013) for recent overview on portfolio liquidation and related issues of market microstructure.
Nash equilibrium
Now suppose that n investors are active in the market, using the respective strategies X 1 , . . . , X n . As in (1), each strategy X i will impact the price process S 0 , thus leading to the following price with aggregated price impact:
Let us denote by X −i the collection X −i := {X 1 , . . . , X i−1 , X i+1 , . . . , X n } of strategies of all competitors of player i. Then player i will obtain the following revenues,
and seek to maximize one of the objective functionals (2), (3), or (4). A natural question is whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all players maximizes their objective functionals given the strategies of their competitors. For the maximization of the expected revenues and vanishing drift this problem is solved in Carlin et al. (2007) within the class of deterministic strategies. It is later extended in to the case in which players have different time horizons and by Moallemi et al. (2012) to a situation with asymmetric information. A system of coupled HJB equations arising from a closed-loop Nash equilibrium for two utility-maximizing agents is studied through numerical simulations by Carmona & Yang (2011) . Here we will now conduct a mathematical analysis of n-player open-loop Nash equilibria for mean-variance optimization (3) and CARA utility maximization (4).
Definition 2.1. Suppose that n ∈ N, x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ R are initial asset positions, and that α 1 , . . . , α n are nonnegative coefficients of risk aversion.
(a) A Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization consists of a collection X * 1 , . . . , X * n of deterministic strategies such that for each i and
(b) A Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization consists of a collection X * 1 , . . . , X * n of admissible strategies such that for each i the strategy X * i ∈ X (x i , T ) maximizes the expected utility
Note that the equilibrium strategies X * i for CARA utility maximization are allowed to be adapted and maximize the expected utility within the entire class X (x i , T ), whereas, for reasons explained above, only deterministic strategies are allowed in mean-variance optimization. We start by formulating a general existence and uniqueness result for the Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization.
Theorem 2.2. For given n ∈ N, α 1 , . . . , α n ≥ 0, and x 1 , . . . , x n there exists a unique Nash equilibrium X * 1 , . . . , X * n for mean-variance optimization. It is given as the unique solution of the following secondorder system of differential equations
with two-point boundary conditions
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
It will become clear from (23) and (24) below that, from a mathematical point of view, the Nash equilibrium constructed above is an open-loop linear-quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state constraints are provided by the liquidation constraints X i (T ) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. They are responsible for the fact that we cannot apply standard results on the existence and uniqueness of open-loop linear-quadratic differential games, and significantly complicate the proof for the existence of Nash equilibria, especially in the case of an infinite time horizon as studied in Section 3. It may also be of interest that the proof of the existence of solutions to (7), (8) rests on the uniqueness of Nash equilibria, which will be established in Lemma 4.1 below.
Our next result states that the unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization. It is an open question, however, whether there may be more than one Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization.
Corollary 2.3. For given n ∈ N, α 1 , . . . , α n ≥ 0, and x 1 , . . . , x n the Nash equilibrium for meanvariance optimization constructed in Theorem 2.2 is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization.
Let us now have a closer look at the system (7). It simplifies when all agents have the same risk aversion:
Corollary 2.4. In the setting of Theorem 2.2 suppose that
is the unique solution of the following one-dimensional two-point boundary value problem
Given Σ, each equilibrium strategy X * i is equal to the unique solution of the following one-dimensional two-point boundary value problem,
It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions of (9) and (10), but the corresponding expressions are quite involved. The situation simplifies when the drift b vanishes identically.
Theorem 2.5. In the setting of Corollary 2.4 assume in addition that b = 0 and α > 0. We define
Then the i th equilibrium strategy X * i is of the form
wher, for
Moreover,
, which solves the two-point boundary value problem (9), is given by
The formulas in Theorem 2.5 can be further simplified in a two-player setting:
Corollary 2.6. In the setting of Theorem 2.5 assume in addition that n = 2. Then
where
(17)
The following mean-field limit is obtained in a straightforward manner by sending n to infinity in Theorem 2.5.
Corollary 2.7. In the setting of Theorem 2.5 suppose that lim n↑∞ 1 n n j=1 x j = x ∈ R. Then, as n ↑ ∞, the equilibrium strategy of agent i converges to
where θ + , θ − , and θ are as in (11) and (12).
Qualitative discussion of the two-player Nash equilibrium
Throughout this section, (X * 1 , X * 2 ) will denote the two-player Nash equilibrium constructed in Corollary 2.6. It is interesting to compare the strategies X * i with the optimal strategy of a single agent without competitors, which, as observed by Almgren (2003) , is given by
where κ = ασ 2 /2λ. This also follows by taking take n = 1 in (15). To study the behavior of the strategies X * 0 , X * 1 , X * 2 we will need the following elementary fact, whose proof is left to the reader.
It follows immediately from this fact that X * 0 (t) is a strictly decreasing function of ασ 2 when x 0 > 0 and 0 < t < T . Economically, this means that the agent will liquidate the initial asset position faster when the perceived volatility risk increases, because var (R(X * 0 )) is proportional to ασ 2 according to (23) and (24) below. So the first guess would be that also the equilibrium strategy X * 1 should be a decreasing function of ασ 2 when x 1 > 0. This guess is also analyzed and tested empirically by Lebedeva et al. (2012) for a large data set of block executions by large insiders. Here, however, all we get from applying (19) to (16) is the following partial result.
is a strictly decreasing function of ασ 2 for 0 < t < T .
As a matter of fact, the monotonicity in ασ 2 may break down in the two-player Nash equilibrium when the conditions x 1 ≥ x 2 and x 2 ≥ 0 in Proposition 2.8 are not both satisfied; see Figures 1 and 2. An intuitive explanation for this failure of monotonicity can be understood from Figure 3 . Here, agent 2 has a larger initial position than agent 1. When ασ 2 increases from 0.1 to 0.8, agent 2 receives a relatively high increase in volatility risk and therefore increases the liquidation speed throughout the first part of [0, T ] while slowing down in the second part. The volatility risk of agent 1 also increases, but it does so less than for agent 2. On the other hand, the increased price pressure from agent 2 leads to unfavorable asset prices for agent 1, and this latter effect outweighs the increased volatility risk. Therefore it is beneficial for agent 1 to delay selling in the first and accelerate the strategy in the second part of the time interval. This leads to the observed increase of the intermediate asset position X * 1 (1). When ασ 2 increases even further, the increase in volatility risk becomes dominant, and so X * 1 (1) starts to decrease. Next, X * 0 (t) is independent of γ, whereas both two-player equilibrium strategies are nontrivial functions of γ. The intuitive reason for this dependence is the fact that the permanent price impact created by the liquidation strategy of one agent is perceived as an additional price trend by the other agent.
Moreover, X * 0 (t) is an increasing function of λ by (19). The monotonicity in λ has the clear economic intuition that increasing the transaction costs from temporary price impact reduces the benefits from an early liquidation and thus drives the optimal strategy toward the linear liquidation strategy that is optimal in the risk-neutral case α = 0. It is also tested and analyzed empirically by Lebedeva et al. (2012) . By applying (19) to (16) it is only possible to obtain the monotonic dependence of X * 1 (t) on γ and λ when x 1 = x 2 :
is a strictly decreasing function of γ and a strictly increasing function of λ for 0 < t < T .
As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the monotonic dependence on γ or λ may break down when the condition x 1 = x 2 from Proposition 2.9 is not satisfied. The intuitive explanation for these effects are similar to the one for the breakdown of monotonicity for ασ 2 . For instance, when λ increases in a Nash equilibrium with 0 < x 1 x 2 , both agents receive an incentive to reduce the curvature of their strategies, that is, to sell slower in the first part of the trading interval and to sell faster during the second part. Agent 2 will therefore create less price impact during the first part of [0, T ] and more price impact in the second part. In equilibrium, this change in price impact generated by one trader creates another incentive for the other trader with just the opposite effect, namely to increase trading speed during the first part of [0, T ] and to reduce it during the second part when the unfavorable price impact generated by the competitor is increased. When the position of agent 1 is smaller than the one of agent 2, this second effect can dominate the increase of transaction costs in the strategy of agent 1 so that we observe the decrease of X * 1 (1) on the leftmost side of Figure 4 . Figure 1: X * 1 (1) as a function of ασ 2 for x 1 = 1.12, x 2 = 2.06, T = 2, and λ = γ = 1. Figure 3: X * 1 (t) (solid) and X * 2 (t) (dashed) as functions of t ∈ [0, T ] for x 1 = 1.12, x 2 = 2.06, T = 2, λ = γ = 1, and ασ 2 = 0.1 (left), ασ 2 = 0.8 (center) and ασ 2 = 2.5 (right). 
Nash equilibrium with infinite time horizon
Now we consider mean-variance optimization and CARA utility maximization for an infinite time horizon [0, ∞). Financially, this problem corresponds to a situation in which none of the agents faces a material time constraint. To simplify the discussion, we assume from the beginning that the drift b(·) vanishes identically. Then the unaffected price process is given by S 0 (t) = S 0 + σW (t) for t ≥ 0. Here we need to assume that σ = 0. If only one agent is active, we are in the situation of , where the problem of maximizing the expected utility of revenues is discussed for an infinite time horizon. As discussed there, a strategy (X(t)) t≥0 should satisfy the following conditions of admissibility so that the utility-maximization problem is well-defined for a single agent:
• X is adapted to the filtration (F t ) t≥0 ; • X is absolutely continuous in the sense that X(t) = X(0) + t 0Ẋ (s) ds for some progressively measurable processẊ(t)) t≥0 for which
• X is bounded and satisfies
The class of all strategies that are admissible in this sense and satisfy X(0) = x for given x ∈ R will be denoted by X (x, ∞). As before we denote by X det (x, ∞) the subclass of all deterministic strategies in X (x, ∞). When the admissible strategy X is used, the affected price process is
It is shown in Schied & Schöneborn (2009, Section 3 .1) that the total revenues of X ∈ X (x, ∞) are P-a.s. well-defined as the limit
(see also Lemma 4.5 below). Moreover, for α > 0, the unique strategy that maximizes the expected utility E[ u α (R(X)) ] over X ∈ X (x, ∞) is given by
see Corollary 4.4 in . Since R(X) is a Gaussian random variable for X ∈ X det (x, ∞) one sees that
and so X * 0 also maximizes the mean-variance functional E[ R(X) ]− α 2 var (R(X)) over X ∈ X det (x, ∞). When n investors apply admissible strategies X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , the affected price S X 1 ,...,Xn (t) is again given by (6), as in the case of a finite time horizon. It will follow from Lemma 4.5 below that the admissibility of X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n guarantees that the following limit exists P-a.s.:
The respective Nash equilibria for mean-variance optimization and CARA utility maximization can now be defined by taking T = ∞ in Definition 2.1. Here is our result on the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization with infinite time horizon:
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that one of the following two conditions holds:
(a) n ∈ N is arbitrary and α 1 = · · · = α n = α > 0;
(b) n = 2 and α 1 and α 2 are distinct and strictly positive.
Then for all x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ R there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization with infinite time horizon, which is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization. In case (a) the optimal strategies are given by
where x n = 1 n n j=1 x j and ρ − and θ − are as in (11). In case (b) the fourth-order equation
has precisely two distinct strictly negative roots, τ 1 , τ 2 , and the equilibrium strategies X * 1 (t) and X * 2 (t) are linear combinations of the exponential functions e τ 1 t and e τ 2 t .
On the one hand, the structure of equilibrium strategies for an infinite time horizon appears to be simpler than for the finite-time situation. On the other hand, the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 are more restrictive than those of Theorem 2.2. The reason is that all solutions X 1 (t), . . . , X n (t) of the system (7) are linear combinations of exponential functions and thus can only take the limits ±∞ and 0 for t ↑ ∞. We therefore cannot apply standard results on the existence of solutions for boundary value problems on noncompact intervals such as those in Cecchi et al. (1980) , where it is required that the possible boundary values at t = ∞ include the full space R n . Instead, we show here that the eigenspaces associated with the negative eigenvalues of a certain nonsymmetric matrix M are sufficiently rich. For n > 2 we are only able to understand these eigenspaces when α 1 = · · · = α n . Let us finally discuss some qualitative properties of the Nash equilibrium in part (a) of Theorem 3.1. One issue that is discussed in Carlin et al. (2007) and is whether agents with zero initial capital, x i = 0 for i = 1, engage in predatory trading or liquidity provision when another agent, say agent 1, is liquidating a large block of shares. Here, predatory trading refers to a strategy during which the asset is shortened at the initial high price and then bought back later when the sell strategy of agent 1 has depreciated the asset price. This strategy is "predatory" in the sense that the revenues it generates for agent i are made at the expense of agent 1. Liquidity provision refers to exactly the opposite strategy: agent i acquires a long position by first buying and later re-selling some of the shares agent 1 is liquidating. It can hence be seen as a cooperative behavior on behalf of agent i. Both Carlin et al. (2007) and consider risk-neutral agents who need to close their positions in finite time. In Carlin et al. (2007) all agents face the same time constraint, and in this case liquidity provision can only be observed if cooperation is enforced by repeating the game. allow a longer time horizon for agent i than for agent 1 and in this case find that liquidity provision may be possible, depending on the market parameters and the number of competitors. Our result here is Corollary 3.3 below. It is illustrated in Figure 6 . Note that by Remark 3.2 the two possibilities of predatory trading and liquidity provision must occur already for finite time horizons T , a fact that is markedly different from the risk-neutral case α = 0 considered in Carlin et al. (2007) and .
Corollary 3.3. In the situation of part (a) of Theorem 3.1 suppose that n i=1 x i > 0. Then an agent with x i = 0 engages in liquidity provision in the sense that X * i (t) > 0 for all t > 0 if and only if ασ 2 λ > 2γ 2 . When ασ 2 λ < 2γ 2 this agent engages in predatory trading, and for ασ 2 λ = 2γ 2 the agent does not trade at all.
Finally, we briefly discuss the behavior of equilibrium strategies as a function of the number n of agents active in the market. Lebedeva et al. (2012) discuss the following two hypothesis and analyze their validity for a large data set of block executions by large insiders: Hypothesis 1: "Trade duration decreases if several insiders compete for exploiting the same longlived information." Hypothesis 2: "Trade duration increases if several insiders trade simultaneously in the same direction for liquidity reasons." In the situation of part (a) of our Theorem 3.1 we typically do indeed find equilibrium strategies that are monotone in n, but the effective trade duration can be both increasing and decreasing in n; see Figures 7 and 8. Here, the effective trade duration can be defined as the time until a certain high percentage of the initial inventory has been liquidated. So both hypotheses from Lebedeva et al. (2012) are compatible with risk-averse agents in an Almgren-Chriss setting. 
Proofs

Proofs for a finite time horizon
Let admissible strategies X i ∈ X (x i , T ) be given and write X −i := {X 1 , . . . , X i−1 , X i+1 , . . . , X n } for i = 1, . . . , n. For Y ∈ X (y, T ) we note first that, after integrating by parts,
When all X i and Y are deterministic, it follows that
where c = yS 0 − γ 2 y 2 and the Lagrangian L i is given by
Lemma 4.1. In the context of Theorem 2.2 there exists at most one Nash equilibrium for meanvariance optimization.
Proof. We assume by way of contradiction that X 0 1 , . . . , X 0 n and X 1 0 , . . . , X 1 n are two distinct Nash equilibria with X k i ∈ X (x i , T ) for i = 1, . . . , n and k = 0, 1. For
By assumption, the strategy
) dt within the class X det (x i , T ) for k = 0, 1. We therefore must have f (β) ≤ f (0) for β > 0, which implies that
On the other hand, by interchanging differentiation and integration, which is permitted due to our assumptions on admissible strategies and due to the linear-quadratic form of the Lagrangian, a short computation shows that
We note next that
Moreover, by the same argument,
and hence
It follows that
which is strictly positive since the two Nash equilibria X 0 1 , . . . , X 0 n and X 1 0 , . . . , X 1 n are distinct. But this contradicts (25).
Lemma 4.2. For i = 1, . . . , n there exists at most one maximizer in
, which is given as the unique solution of the two-point boundary value problem
Proof. It follows from the strict concavity of the Lagrangian L i and the convexity of the set X det (y, T ) that there can be at most one maximizer in X det (y, T ). Now we show the existence of a maximizer under the additional assumption
,Ẏ (t)|X −i ) read as follows for our problem:
with boundary condition Y (0) = y and Y (T ) = 0. Denoting the right-hand side of (26) by u(t), the general solution of this second-order ODE is of the form
where c 1 and c 2 are constants and κ i = α i σ 2 /2λ. It is clear that the two constants c 1 and c 2 can be uniquely determined by imposing the boundary conditions Y (0) = y and Y (T ) = 0. From now on, let
T ] denote the corresponding solution. We will now verify that Y * is indeed a maximizer of our problem. To this end, let Y ∈ X det (y, T ) be arbitrary. Using first the concavity of (q, p) → L i (t, q, p|X −i ) and then the fact that Y * solves the Euler-Lagrange equation (26), we get
where in the final step we have used that Y * (0) = Y (0) and Y * (T ) = Y (T ). This proves the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. According to Lemma 4.1 there exists at most one Nash equilibrium. We will now show that there exists a Nash equilibrium X * 1 , . . . , X * n such that each strategy X * i belongs to
. By Lemma 4.2, each strategy X * i must then be a solution of the second-order differential equation
with boundary conditions
We can clearly combine the n differential equations (28) into a system of n coupled second-order linear ordinary differential equations for the vector X * := (X * 1 , . . . , X * n ) . It follows again from Lemma 4.2 that every solution of the system (28), (29) is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore it will be sufficient to show the existence of a solution to the n-dimensional two-point boundary value problem (28), (29).
By introducing the auxiliary function Y (t) for the derivativeẊ(t), by letting b(t) be the vector with all components equal to b(t), and by defining the n × n matrices A := σ 2 diag(α 1 , . . . , α n ), the identity matrix I = diag(1, . . . , 1), and the matrix J with all entries equal to one, the system (28) can be re-written as follows:
Clearly, X solves (28) if and only if Ẋ X solves (30). In particular every solution of (30) with boundary conditions (29) yields a Nash equilibrium. Now consider the homogeneous system (30), (29) with b(t) = 0 and initial values x 1 = · · · = x n = 0. The corresponding boundary condition can be written as
where V ⊂ R 4n is the 2n-dimensional linear space
It is clear that
0 is a solution. In fact this trivial solution is the only solution since every solution must be a Nash equilibrium, and Nash equilibria are unique by Lemma 4.1. It therefore follows from the general theory of linear boundary value problems for systems of ordinary differential equations that the two-point boundary value problem (30), (31) (30)); see Kurzweil (1986, (9.22), p. 189) . Using this fact, we let X 0 Y 0 be the solution of (30), (31) 
One then checks that
solves (28), (29) and is thus the desired Nash equilibrium.
Remark 4.3. With Z(t) := (X(t), Y (t)) the system (30) can be written aṡ 
Proof of Corollary 2.3. Let X * 1 , . . . , X * n be the unique Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization as constructed in Theorem 2.2. When X * −i := {X * 1 , . . . , X * i−1 , X * i+1 , . . . , X * n } is fixed, the i th agent perceives
as "unaffected" price process. It is of the form T has all exponential moments, i.e., E e βS X * −i T < ∞ for all β ∈ R, it follows as in Schied et al. (2010, Theorem 2.1 
But for α i > 0 and X ∈ X det (x i , T ) we have
which shows that CARA utility maximization is equivalent to the maximization of the corresponding mean-variance functional. The corresponding result for α i = 0 is obvious.
Proof of Corollary 2.4. Letting Σ(t) := n j=1 X j (t) and re-writing (7) yields
and hence (10). Summing over i then implies (9). Now we prepare for the proof of Theorem 2.5.
Lemma 4.4. For α 1 = · · · = α n = α > 0 the matrix M from (33) has four real eigenvalues θ + , θ − , ρ + , ρ − given by (11). Moreover, with 1 ∈ R n denoting the vector with all entries equal to 1, the corresponding eigenspaces are given by
Proof. Let us write an arbitrary vector in R 2n as
we see that we must have v 2 = τ v 1 for
to be an eigenvector with eigenvalue τ . So let us consider vectors in R 2n of the form
When v = 1 then Jv = nv and (34) becomes the quadratic equation
which is solved for τ = ρ + and τ = ρ − . When v ⊥ 1 then Jv = 0 and (34) becomes the quadratic equation
which is solved for τ = θ + and τ = θ − . Since the eigenvectors found thus far span the entire space R 2n , the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. It follows from Theorem 2.2 and its proof that X * 1 , . . . , X * n are obtained from the solutions of (32) for f (t) = 0. The general solution of this system is of the form Z(t) = e tM Z(0). By Lemma 4.4, M is diagonalizable and so every solution Z(t) must be a linear combination of exponential functions e τ t , where τ is an eigenvalue of M . Another application of Lemma 4.4 thus implies that each X * i can be represented as in (13). One finally checks that for c i (θ + ), c i (θ − ), c(ρ + ), c(ρ − ) as in (14) the boundary conditions X * i (0) = x i and X * i (T ) = 0 are satisfied. That (15) solves the two-point boundary problem (9) can be verified by a straightforward computation.
Proof of Corollary 2.6. From (15) we have that Σ(t) = X * 1 (t) + X * 2 (t) is given by (17). When letting ∆(t) := X * 1 (t) − X * 2 (t), we get from (10) that ∆ solves the two-point boundary value problem
This boundary value problem is solved by (18).
Proofs for an infinite time horizon
Lemma 4.5. For X i ∈ X (x i , ∞), i = 1, . . . , n, the limit R(X i |X −i ) := − lim T ↑∞ T 0Ẋ i (t)S X 1 ,...,Xn (t) dt exists and is given by
Proof. Integrating by parts yields
The assertion now follows by using the law of the iterated logarithm for W , (20), (21), and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Now let X i ∈ X (x i , ∞), i = 1, . . . , n, be given. As in (23), (24) we get that for Y ∈ X (y, ∞),
where c = yS 0 − γ 2 y 2 and the Lagrangian L i is given by (24). Note that we must have α i σ 2 > 0 to have a chance to obtain solutions of the mean-variance optimization problem for otherwise the Lagrangian is linear. Lemma 4.6. For i = 1, . . . , n and α i > 0 the functional Y → ∞ 0 L i (t, Y (t),Ẏ (t)|X −i ) dt has at most one maximizer in X det (y, ∞). If, moreover, X 1 , . . . , X n belong to C 2 [0, ∞) and are such that Proof. It follows from the strict concavity of the Lagrangian L i and the convexity of the set X det (y, ∞) that there can be at most one maximizer in X det (y, ∞). Now we show the existence of a maximizer under the additional assumptions X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ C 2 [0, ∞) and (35). As noted in the proof of Lemma 4.2, the general solution of the Euler-Lagrange equation (26) 
where u(t) = γ j =iẊ j (t) + λ j =iẌ j (t), c 1 and c 2 are constants, and κ i = α i σ 2 /2λ > 0. One checks that (35) implies that Proof of Theorem 3.1. One first shows just as in Lemma 4.1 that there can be at most one Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization. Moreover, one shows as in the proof of Corollary 2.3 that a Nash equilibrium for mean-variance optimization is also a Nash equilibrium for CARA utility maximization.
Now we turn to the proof of existence of a Nash equilibrium for given initial values x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ R. Let M be the 2n × 2n-matrix defined in Remark 4.3. As observed in the proof of Lemma 4.4, any eigenvector of M with eigenvalue τ must be of the form v τ v for some v ∈ R n . We will show below that in both cases, (a) and (b), there exists a basis v 1 , . . . , v n of R n and numbers τ 1 , . . . , τ n < 0 (which are not necessarily distinct) such that
